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Among the ancient schools of theology, Alexandria holds special prominence.
The school began about 185 a.d. for the exclusive purpose of instructing
converts from paganism to Christianity. Very quickly, and under the leadership
of its principal theologians, Clement and Origen, it evolved into a major
theological think-tank of ancient Christianity. On one hand, the school played
an important role in spurring the development of many Christian doctrines,
including the doctrines of God, Christ, the Trinity, and salvation. On the other,
however, theological aberrations incontrovertibly present in the thought of
the Alexandrian thinkers left a troubling legacy. These errors have never been
completely eradicated from Christian theology, have persisted throughout the
centuries, and continue to periodically resurface in various theological circles,
including Adventism. In recent years, a version of an ancient error closely
resembling Alexandrian subordinationism1 has resurfaced within some
factions of the Adventist community.
It is my belief that an understanding of the theological thinking of the
Alexandrian school, however remote and seemingly irrelevant to believing
Christians today, may aid in understanding the issues involved in modern-day
trinitarian and soteriological debates, as well as protecting the community of
believers from perpetuating the errors present in the Alexandrian thinking.2
Let us begin with a brief overview of trinitarian developments up to the rise
of Alexandrian thinking.
Pre-Alexandrian Solutions
It goes without saying that the NT leaves its readers with a somewhat ambiguous
picture regarding the doctrine of the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus Christ.
Subordinationism teaches that, whether in heaven or on earth, Christ is eternally
subordinate to God the Father. In this school of thought, the Holy Spirit is perceived
as either the third person of the Trinity, eternally subordinated to God the Father and
Christ, or the nonpersonal power of God.
2
For a deeper study that may aid in understanding the issues presented in this
paper, see Joseph Trigg, Origen (London: Routledge, 1998). In their groundbreaking
Early Arianism: A View of Salvation, Robert C. Gregg and Dennis E. Groh show how
Alexandrian Christology eventually resulted in full-blown Arian heresy (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1981, e.g., 108-111); see also Jerry Moon, John Reeve, and Woodrow
Whidden, The Trinity (Hagerstown: Review and Herald, 2002), esp. 135-139.
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On one hand, it is evident that the NT has no argument with the monotheistic
tradition of the OT (see, e.g., Acts 17:22-31 and 1 Cor 8:4). On the other, it
is also evident that the monotheistic status quo of the OT is challenged. While
from the outset Christian believers saw themselves as continuators of the
Jewish monotheistic tradition, they also presented themselves as believing in
Jesus Christ, whom they described as having the characteristics that in the OT
were decisively reserved for the deity (Luke 7:49; John 8:58; Phil 2:6; Col 2:9).
Moreover, the Holy Spirit also received more attention and is presented in a
different way from that found in the OT (John 14:16-18; Eph 4:20). It is not
surprising, therefore, to find early postapostolic Christians grappling with the
new vision of the divine and its implications for the salvation of humanity.
While all recognized the special status of Christ (and the Holy Spirit), they
nevertheless struggled to explain how this harmonized with the monotheistic
conception of God and his function as the only redeemer of humanity. As a
result, a variety of positions attempting to harmonize the OT monotheistic
vision of the divine with the NT data developed, some inclined toward the
extreme. Thus, at one end of the spectrum were those who tended to speak
of Christ as an elevated human being, the Messiah, but not God.3 The other
extreme was populated by those who yearned to protect the unity of God and
tended to identify Christ and the Holy Spirit with God.4 The remainder of
the early Christians found themselves somewhere between these two extreme
positions.
Several things can be said of these early, pre-Nicaean5 efforts to explain
the relationship between God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit. First, they all
emphasized the unity of God and, second, they tended to place Christ and
the Holy Spirit in some form of subordinate relationship to the supreme God
of the OT.6 Despite this, significant strides toward the recognition of Christ’s
3
Ebionism may be cited as an early movement that is representative of this view.
Coming from a strong monotheistic position, this group could not reconcile the OT
teachings on the deity with the Christian emphasis on the divinity of Christ. For a
detailed description of the Ebionite heresy, see Millard J. Erickson, The Word Became
Flesh (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 42-44.
4
While emphasizing the unity of God, the Christian heresy known as Modalistic
Monarchianism rejected the separate existence of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit.
Instead, it saw Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit as different modes of the Father’s
existence. This heresy is also known as Patripassianism, or suffering of the Father
(Erickson, 48-50). Both of these extremes (Ebionistic and Modalistic heresies), already
considered deviant during the early Christian centuries, are still present within modern
Christianity.
5
“Pre-Nicaean” refers to the time in the history of Christianity prior to the First
Council of Nicaea in 325 a.d.
6
This is well illustrated by Tertullian, who states: “Thus the Father is distinct
from the Son, being greater than the Son, in as much as He who begets is one, and
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full divinity and coequality within the Trinity7 were made during the second
century by thinkers such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian.8 The work
of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, the chief thinkers of the Alexandrian
school of theology, fits within this tradition of trinitarian thinking.
Clement of Alexandria (ca. 155-215 a.d.)
Little is known of Titus Flavius Clemens, otherwise known as Clement of
Alexandria. It appears that he was born in Athens, where he received his early
education. He was a pagan convert to Christianity, who became the head of
the Alexandrian school of theology upon the death of its founder, Pantaenus,
and was the teacher of Origen.9 Three extant works are attributed to him: the
Protreptikos (Exhortation to the Heathen), in which he urges pagans to convert
to Christianity; the Paidagogos, the purpose of which was to teach Christians
He who is begotten is another; He, too, who sends is one, and He who is sent is
another; and He, again, who makes is one, and He through whom the thing is made
is another” (Prax. 9; ANF 3:604). Other early Christian fathers exhibited a similar
tendency. Thus W. Marcus states: “It [subordinationism] is a characteristic tendency in
much Christian teaching of the first three centuries, and is a marked feature of such
otherwise orthodox Fathers such as St Justin and St Irenaeus” (“Subordinationism,”
The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church [1997]: 1552).
7
The very term “Trinity” also traces its origin to this era. Theophilus of Antioch
(ca. 180 a.d.) was the first Christian thinker to use the Greek term tria,j (Autol. 2.15;
ANF 2:101), while Tertullian was the first to introduce the Latin version of the term
into Christian theology. Tarmo Toom, Classical Trinitarian Theology (New York: T. & T.
Clark, 2007), 62; Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 66.
8
Thus Justin Martyr wrote: “both Him and the Son (who came forth from Him
and taught us these things . . . ), and the prophetic Spirit, we worship and adore, knowing
them in reason and truth” (1 Apol. 6; ANF 1:164); similarly, Irenaeus put forth his three
famous articles of faith: “God, the Father, uncreated, beyond grasp, invisible, one God
the maker of all; this is the first and foremost article of our faith. But the second article
is the Word of God, the Son of God, Christ Jesus our Lord. . . . And the third article
is the Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied and the patriarchs were
taught about God” (Epid. 6, trans. and ed. Joseph P. Smith [New York: Newman, 1952],
51); and, finally, Tertullian, with reference to Gen 1:26, wrote that “it was because He
had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third
Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, ‘Let us
make;’ and, ‘in our image;’ and, ‘become as one of us’” (Prax. 12; ANF 3:606, emphasis
original).
It must be noted, however, that while pointing the way toward the later
development of belief in the coequality of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit within the
Trinity, none of these early pre-Nicaean thinkers fully embraced these concepts.
9
Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1975), 146-147; cf. Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory
the Great (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 124-125.
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the fundamentals of Christian conduct; and the Stromateis (Miscellanies), a
collection of loosely organized notes dealing with various theological issues.10
Clement left behind no systematic theology, a task later attempted by his most
illustrious student, Origen.11 He held strong beliefs that Greek philosophy,
especially Middle Platonism,12 was closely related to Christian theology, and he
saw Christianity as the final development of Greek philosophical ideals. God,
he argued, gave philosophy to the Greeks in much the same way he provided
the Hebrews with the Law of Moses.13 Believing that “all truth is God’s truth
wherever it may be found,” a saying often attributed to him, Clement felt no
restraints in using pagan Greek philosophy to explain the intricacies of the
Christian faith, while at the same time making it more reasonable to the pagan
mind.14
Clement’s teachings on God and the Trinity began with his affirmation
of the absolute transcendence of God, an idea clearly echoing the main
characteristic of the Supreme Mind, or “the One,” of Middle Platonism.15
Walker, 73; Latourette, 147.
Justo Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought: From the Beginnings to the Council of
Chalcedon (Nashville: Abingdon, 1987), 204; Walker, 74.
12
Middle Platonism, sometimes referred to as pre-Neoplatonism, was an
improvement on Platonic “good” and postulated the existence of the divine mind
that could, at a stretch, be reminiscent of the Christian God. The Platonic “ideas,”
or “forms,” thus existed in the mind of God. Middle Platonism was the form of
Greek philosophy used and adapted by the Alexandrian theologians. For an extensive
description of Middle Platonism, see John Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977); cf. Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 364-366.
13
Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525); cf. Gonzalez, 193; and Alister E.
McGrath, Historical Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 89.
14
Roger E. Olson and Adam C. English, Pocket History of Theology (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity, 2005), 20; Calvin Stapert, A New Song for an Old World: Musical
Thought in the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 46-47.
15
Henry Fiska Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 155-159. Thus Clement wrote: “And if we
give him a name, either we call him the One or the Good or Mind or Being or Father
or God or the Demiurge or Lord, we do not do it in a correct way, and we do not talk
as if conferring a name on him. But because of our helplessness, we use nice names so
that our mind may have these things to lean upon and not wander at random. For one
by one they do not contain information about God, but all together they are indicative
of the power of the Almighty” (Clement, Strom. 5.82.1-2; Hägg, 156, translation his);
cf. Robert McQueen Grant, Gods and the One God (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986),
91. Roger Olson provides an apt description of the philosophical conception of God
that goes back to Plato: “Clement’s God was like the God of Greek philosophy—a
bare unity without parts or passions that cannot even be described except negatively
and who can only relate to the world of nature and history through an intermediate
10
11
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As such, God was ineffable, timeless, and completely beyond the power of
human comprehension. As a result, there was need for a mediator, the Logos.16
This Logos was the source of all knowledge available to humanity, and, most
especially, of the knowledge of God. It was the Logos who “gave philosophy
to Greeks,” prepared the way for Christianity, and which became paidagogos (or
teacher or instructor), for Christian believers.17
Clement spoke highly of the Logos, whom he identified with the biblical
Son of God. He wrote of the Son: “Now, O you, my children, our Instructor
is like His Father God, whose Son He is, sinless, blameless, and with a soul
devoid of passion; God in the form of man, stainless, the minister of His
Father’s will, the Word who is God, who is in the Father, who is at the Father’s
right hand, and with the form of God is God.”18 He further identified the Son
as the wisdom of God, the “energy of the Father,” the “cause of all good
things,” “the first efficient cause of motion,” and “the first Administrator
of the universe, who by the will of the Father directs the salvation of all.”19
Despite using such exalted language in speaking of the Son, endowing him
with pre-existence, and even bestowing upon him the title “God,” Clement
hesitated to ascribe to him the supreme, underived divinity that would make
the Logos equal with God. Thus, nowhere in his writings can one find such
an identification made in clear, unequivocal terms.20 Instead, we find in
Clement statements such as “For the Son is the power of God, as being
the Father’s most ancient Word before the production of all things”; “the
Son is . . . an energy of the Father”; “But the nature of the Son, which is
nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, and most
holy.”21 A careful exegesis of Clement’s writings by a scholar of antiquity,
Alvan Lamson, prompted him to conclude that “none of the Platonizing
Fathers before Origen have acknowledged the inferiority of the Son in more
explicit terms than Clement.”22 Louis Berkhof concurred when he argued
being called Logos” (The Story of Christian Theology [Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Academic, 1999], 90).
16
Clement, Paed. 3.1 (ANF 2:271). Hägg, 181; and John Ferguson, Clement of
Alexandria (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974), 62, 90.
17
Clement, Strom. 7.2; 6.5 (ANF 2:524, 489); cf. Gonzalez, 191-193.
18
Clement, Paed. 1.2 (ANF 2:209-210).
19
Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525).
20
Alvan Lamson, The Church of the First Three Centuries (Boston: Walker, Wise, and
Co.), 88-89; cf. Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria on Trial (Leiden: Brill,
2010), 62-63; and Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford: Claredon,
1886), 67-68.
21
Clement, Strom. 7.2 (ANF 2:524-525).
22
Lamson, 88; cf. Eric Osborn, The Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 184.
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that, although Clement came close to recognizing Christ’s full divinity, he
nevertheless could not escape the clutches of subordinationism. While he
spoke of the Logos’s eternity, Clement defined “the phrase in such a way as
to teach not merely an economic but an essential subordination of the Son
to the Father.”23 Indeed, the Middle Platonic monistic understanding of the
deity as simple and undivided would preclude any complexity in the nature of
God, while, at the same time, welcome the existence of inferior intermediaries
such as the Logos.24
How did the Logos become Christ, according to Clement? Prior to its
generation, the Logos existed in the form of “wisdom” in the mind of God
and as a potential being. In this way, Clement could boldly ascribe eternity to
Christ.25 In eternity past, the Logos issued forth (“emanated,” or “generated”)
from the Father.26 Clement described this process in terms closely resembling
the bringing forth of the World Soul from the Supreme Mind of Middle
Platonic philosophy.27 Following this stage of his existence, when the Logos
“was with God,” the Word became incarnated in the human form of Jesus
Christ, the Son of God.28 The life of Christ, as the incarnated Logos, was a
23
Louis Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines (London: Banner of Truth Trust,
1937), 72; cf. Chadwick, 128. Economic subordination versus essential subordination
corresponds to the economic versus essential understanding of the Trinity. The former
refers to the way in which the Godhead was revealed and related to humanity, i.e., the
position that the Son has the same divine attributes as the Father, but voluntarily
submitted himself to the Father while on earth. Essential Trinity is a view of the
Godhead as it existed prior to incarnation and after the resurrection of Christ. The
essential subordination position thus puts forth a view that Christ was subordinated to
God not only while here on earth, but also throughout eternity.
24
Middle Platonism and its influence upon Clement’s thought is well documented
by Hägg; see esp. 71-133, 143, 159, 181-185.
25
Lamson, 78; cf. Harry Wolfson, “Clement of Alexandria on the Generation of
the Logos,” Church History 20 (June 1951): 75.
26
By the time of Clement, the concept of “generation” already had a long
philosophical history. Having its roots in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, the theory
continued to be developed within various philosophical circles of antiquity. Gitte BuchHansen, “It Is the Spirit that Gives Life”: A Stoic Understanding of Pneuma in John’s Gospel
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 178-179. For the Gnostic Valentinian theologians of the
second century a.d., generation, or emanation, denoted the procession of the Gnostic
Savior. It was thus natural for Clement to avail himself of the long philosophical
tradition to explain the genesis of the Christian Savior (Alastair H. B. Logan, Gnostic Truth
and Christian Heresy [London: T. & T. Clark, 2004], 33). For Clement, the “generation”
of the Logos was absolutely necessary, as without it the ineffable and timeless God
would not be able to communicate with creation (Hägg, 158-159, 181; Olson, 90).
27
Salvatore R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and
Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 202-204.
28
Hägg, 187-188; Clement, Strom. 5.3 (ANF 2, 448).
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continuation of the perfect union with God that he had had in his preexistent
state.29 Christ is thus perfectly positioned to become “our Instructor” and
source of all true gnosis (in contrast to the false gnosis of the Gnostics).30
This knowledge was essential for Christians to enter upon a path of
salvation31 that would ultimately end in being “godlike,” which Clement defines
as being “impassible” or free from passion in all aspects of life.32 Through
this knowledge, Christ teaches believers to distinguish good from evil and
“cures the unnatural passions of the soul by means of exhortations.”33
But Christ is more than just a conduit of divine knowledge. He also serves
as an example of virtuous living to believers.34 A believer is to reproduce
Christ’s obedience to the commandments, even if it leads to martyrdom.
Indeed, he who follows a path to martyrdom suffers out of love for God
and “for his own salvation.”35 Thus, following the example of Christ by being
obedient to the commandments was a sure way to eternal life. In Clement’s
own words, “Let us then aim at the fulfillment of the commandments by the
works of the Lord; for the Word Himself also, having openly become flesh,
exhibited the same virtue, both practical and contemplative. Wherefore let
us regard the Word as law, and His commands and counsels as the short and
straight paths to immortality.”36
Unfortunately, such hellenizing exerted a heavy price on Clement’s
soteriology and took him on a path foreign to that of the NT. His emphasis
on attainment of the true gnosis, on obedience, and on following the example
of Christ led him to place more value on human achievement than on Christ’s
accomplishments on the cross. Indeed, the value of Christ’s sacrifice on
Calvary seems to be little more than an example of a “perfect work of love.”37
Instead, Clement appeared to be more interested in the “philosophical”
accomplishments and qualities of the incarnated Logos, such as sinless
Chadwick, 128.
Clement, Paed. 1.7 (ANF 2:222-223); Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:497); cf. 1.20
(ANF 2:323).
31
In fact, Clement sees this knowledge as inseparable from salvation. “The
knowledge of God [and] everlasting salvation . . . are entirely identical” (Strom. 4.22;
ANF 2:434); idem, Paed. 1.2-3 (ANF 2:210-211); cf., Hägg, 143-144.
32
Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:496-497); cf. Eric Osborn, Clement of Alexandria
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 234.
33
Clement, Paed. 1.2 (ANF 2:210).
34
“But having assumed sensitive flesh, He came to show man what was possible
through obedience to the commandments” (Clement, Strom. 7.2; ANF 2:525).
35
Ibid., 4.4, 7 (ANF 2:411, 417).
36
Clement, Paed. 1.3 (ANF 2:211).
37
Clement, Strom. 4.4 (ANF 2:411-412).
29
30
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perfection and passionlessness.38 In this, and in contrast to the writers of the
NT, Clement followed the well-established trajectory of thought present in
the various strands of Greek philosophy, where through special knowledge
and self-sacrifice a person could become Godlike, sinless, devoid of passion,
anger, and carnal desires.39 “Abstinence from what is evil,” Clement argued,
“is a step to the highest perfection.”40 This, he believed, was the highest
accomplishment of the apostles, who mastered such an attitude “through
a steady condition of mind, not changing a whit [and] . . . ever continuing
unvarying in a state of training after the resurrection of the Lord.”41
It becomes clear, therefore, that Clement promoted “deification” or
becoming “godlike”42 as the mode of salvation.43 Such an understanding of
salvation requires a rather optimistic anthropology, in which human beings
innately possess the ability to embark on the journey toward perfection.44
In his classic of Clement’s writings, G. W. Butterworth identifies five stages
of deification. First, there is baptism, followed by enlightenment, sonship,
perfection, and immortality. “Perfection and immortality,” Butterworth notes,
“are of course two prominent characteristics of God, and when man attains
them he becomes like God.”45 What was the source of Clement’s ideas on
deification, i.e., becoming God-like while on this earth? Butterworth answers:
“Certainly it was not in the Scriptures. There is nothing in either the Old
Testament or the New Testament which by itself could even faintly suggest
that man might practice being a god in this world.” He lays the blame squarely
at the feet of Greek philosophy, and especially Plato, who viewed the life of
Thus Clement writes: “But He [Christ] was entirely impassible . . . inaccessible
to any movement of feeling—either pleasure or pain” (ibid., 6.9; ANF 2:496).
39
Ibid., 4.22 (ANF 2:435); 6.9 (ANF 2:496-497).
40
Ibid., 4.22 (ANF 2:434).
41
Ibid., 6.9 (ANF 2:496); cf. idem, 4.21 and 22 (ANF 2:434-435).
42
Clement, Strom. 6.9 (ANF 2:497). Clement was one of the earliest Christian
theologians to use the term theopoieo, “being made like God.” This term is closely
associated with the concept of theosis (usually translated as “divinization,” “deification,”
“being made divine”), which became the hallmark of pre-Nicaean Eastern Christian
theology. G. W. Butterworth notes that while there are slight differences among the
early Christian theologians who wrote in Greek, all are essentially in agreement with
Clement’s views on deification (“The Deification of Man in Clement of Alexandria,”
JTS (Old series) 17 (1916): 162; cf. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 234.
43
“To the likeness of God, then, he that is introduced into adoption and the
friendship of God . . . if he be perfected, according to the Gospel, as the Lord Himself
taught” (Clement, Strom. 6.14; ANF 2:506); cf. 6.9 (ANF 2:497).
44
Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 234; cf. Clement, Strom. 4:23 (ANF 2:436-437).
It must be noted that most of the pre-Nicaean Greek-speaking theologians shared
Clement’s optimistic view of human nature.
45
Butterworth, 160.
38
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an enlightened human being as a gradual ascent toward sinless perfection, and
thus divinity.46
In view of the heavy influence of Middle Platonism upon Clement’s
understanding of God and the Logos, the mediator and the transmitter of
the true gnosis, it is not surprising that his Christ was not, and indeed could
not be, coequal with the Almighty God. The Middle Platonic influence upon
his thought would clearly preclude such a possibility. Instead, like a Greek
philosopher of a higher order, Christ is the medium as well as the “teacher”
who imparts true divine gnosis and who provides an example of an enlightened
life. If this is the mode of salvation, then there is no logical requirement for
Christ to be coequal in all attributes to God the Father.
How does the Holy Spirit fit into Clement’s theology? There appears
to be scholarly agreement that Clement’s writings on the Holy Spirit tend to
be vague and contradictory, with no clear explanation as to the Spirit’s exact
nature or relationship to the Father and the Son.47 In fact, as R. B. Tollington
noted, there appears to be little room in Clement’s theological system for the
Holy Spirit, as all the functions assigned by the NT to the Spirit are fulfilled
by the Logos. Thus he states,
If Christian theology had developed on Clement’s lines, it would have
resulted in a different conception of the Trinity from that which the
Church eventually adopted. It would have given us a transcendent Father,
an all-pervading Logos or Spirit, a supreme historic manifestation at the
Incarnation. And the last named would have been so purely a mode or
limitation of the universal Logos, that a Duality rather than a Trinity would
have been the result.48

Despite leaving questions regarding the exact nature of the Logos and
the Holy Spirit as well as their relationship to God unanswered, Clement did,
at times, speak of the triune nature of God, while the trinitarian formulas
are found throughout his works.49 Unquestionably clothed in Christian
Ibid., 163.
Latourette, 148. William G. Rusch writes that Clement viewed the Spirit as the
power that emanates from the Word and is diffused through creation in order to attract
human beings to God (The Trinitarian Controversy [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980], 12).
48
R. B. Tollington, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism (London:
Williams and Norgate, 1914), 1:359-360. Bogdan Gabriel Bucur came to a similar
conclusion. He thus writes: “Clement illustrates a widespread phenomenon in early
Christian thought, namely the lack of careful distinction between ‘Logos’ and ‘Spirit.’
Whenever he offers his own theological reflection (as opposed to simply passing
on traditional formulas of faith), Clement feels free to use ‘Logos’ and ‘Pneuma’
as synonyms by shifting between them repeatedly and without much explanation”
(Angelomorphic Pneumatology: Clement of Alexandria and Other Early Christian Witnesses
[Leiden: Brill, 2009], 75).
49
See, e.g., Clement, Paed. 3.12 (ANF 2:295), in which Clement provides this
46
47
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terminology; however, his descriptions of the Deity are heavily influenced by
the models of the divine and of salvation (i.e., acquirement of the true gnosis)
found in the prevailing philosophy of the age in which he lived.50 While his
subordinationistic views were more tacit than pronounced, Clement’s most
eminent student, Origen, took his teacher’s theology and developed it in a
more systematic way.
Origen of Alexandria (ca. 185-254 a.d.)
Recognized for his brilliance, Origen was chosen by Clement to take over the
leadership of the catechetical school in Alexandria, a position the latter held
until at least 231 a.d. Unlike Clement, Origen was born into a Christian family
and from an early age was exposed to the teachings of the Bible and the early
church fathers. As a student, and later as the head of the catechetical school,
he distinguished himself by careful scholarship and a successful writing career.
With regard to the scope of his work, Origen is often compared to Augustine,
and it is estimated that he produced over six thousand scrolls containing
various theological discourses.51 Known as the systematic theologian of
the Alexandrian school, he surpassed Clement in constructing a theological
system in which he sought to harmonize the emerging Neoplatonism with
Christianity.52 Unlike many other church fathers, and notwithstanding his
extraordinary contributions to theology, Origen was never canonized as a
saint, as posterity was unable to decide if he was an orthodox or a heretic.53
On one hand, his work led many pagan thinkers to take Christianity seriously.
On the other, his syncretistic approach to theology created confusion and
much heartache to future generations of theologians.54 His theological legacy
remarkable trinitarian formula: “and giving thanks may praise, and praising thank the
[sic ] Alone Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son, Instructor and Teacher, with the
Holy Spirit, all in One, in whom is all, for whom all is One” (Clement, Strom. 4.26;
ANF 2:439).
50
Rusch, 12.
51
Gonzalez, 205; Chadwick, 135; Olson, The Story of Christian Faith, 99.
52
Neoplatonism was a philosophical system that originated with Plotinus (ca.
205-270 a.d.). It emerged in the footsteps of Middle Platonism at the time of Origen
(The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church [1997], sv “Neoplatonism”).
53
While many theologians of the early church were deeply influenced by Origen,
and his views were considered influential for formulation of trinitarian doctrines in
the fourth century, some of his views were condemned during the Second Council
of Constantinople in 553 a.d. For a carefully nuanced discussion on Origen, see the
excellent volume by Elizabeth Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992).
54
Olson, The Story of Christian Theology, 102. One such heartache was caused by
Origen’s universalistic views of salvation. For a recent analysis of Origen’s universalism,
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is thus ambiguous. His greatest works on theology are Contra Celsum (Against
Celsus) and De Principiis (On First Principles). Despite his fame, he lived a simple,
ascetic life.55
The entire trinitarian theology of Origen is governed by three a priori
principles that he considered as self-evident teachings of the NT: first, there
is one God who is the Father of Jesus Christ; second, Jesus Christ was born
of the Father before all creatures; and, third, “the Holy Spirit was associated
in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son.”56 Origen’s theology of the
Trinity also began with the person of God and his nature and, like Clement,
he tended to describe God in monistic terms. God the Father, he insisted, was
“altogether Mona,j [Monad ], and so to speak, `Ena,j [Henad ].”57 In philosophical
language, both of these terms referred to an indivisible, hence ultimately
simple and unknowable entity, the latter even more strongly conveying these
qualities.58 God was thus incomprehensible; transcendent; perfect in every
way; without body, parts, or passion; the Absolute One, nothing of whom
could possibly be known.59 No other form of existence could ever assume
its place. For this, Origen found support in Jesus’ statement that the Father
is “the only true God” (John 17:3). Thus, Jesus’ Father alone was ingenerate,
having no explanation for his existence.60 Those who attempted to explain
God in terms of complexity endangered his absolute unity and eternal
existence. Origen explained: “But God, who is the beginning of all things, is
not to be regarded as a composite [or complex] being, lest perchance there
should be found to exist elements prior to the beginning itself, out of which
everything is composed, whatever that be which is called composite.”61 This
being alone, the uncreated Creator, Sustainer of the universe, was the ultimate
source of all existence.62 In spite of Origen’s frequent use of NT language, his
“God” thus had more in common with the Platonic conception of the deity
than with the God of the Bible.
see Mark S. M. Scott, “Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation: The Pastoral Pedagogy of
Origen’s Universalism,” JECS 18 (Fall 2010): 347-368.
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Trigg, 14.
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Origen, Princ. “Introduction” 4 (ANF 4:240); cf. Bernhard Lohse, A Short
History of Christian Doctrine (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 46.
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Origen, Princ. 1.1.6 (ANF 4:243).
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J. Hirschberger, “Monad,” The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967), 9:1018.
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Origen, Princ. 1.1.1 (ANF 4:242-243).
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Ibid., 1.2.4 (ANF 4:247-248); cf. Donald K. McKim, Theological Turning Points:
Major Issues in Christian Thought (Atlanta: John Knox, 1988), 12; and Peter McEnhill and
G. M. Newlands, Fifty Key Christian Thinkers (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2002), 172.
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Since Origen conceived his God in terms of perfect goodness and
power, he claimed that there must have always existed the object toward
which he could exercise his goodness and power. Origen thus posited the
existence of a timeless and eternal universe inhabited by spiritual beings
(or souls), which existed in coeternal relationship with him but which were
always subordinate.63 The unity of God and the multiplicity of the universe,
however, were incompatible. To bring together the absolute divine unity with
the multiplicity of spiritual beings, Origen argued for the eternal existence of
a mediator, the eternal Logos. But where did the Logos come from? To explain
the existence of the Logos, Origen turned to Neoplatonism, which posited
the existence of subordinate beings in terms of generation, procession, or
emanation rather than in the language of creation. Neoplatonic teachers
taught that out of the “Absolute One” there proceeds (emanates) the Mind
(nous). This Mind, they insisted, was not created and thus has no beginning.64
While Clement appeared to be somewhat ambivalent with regard to the
concept of Middle Platonic generation, the genius of Origen lies in the fact
that he embraced the idea of generation wholeheartedly and thus explained
the relationship between the Father and the Son (the Logos).65 Notwithstanding
the danger of oversimplification, the concept of “eternal generation” can
be made intelligible by comparing it to the process of yeast reproduction.
Yeasts are unicellular organisms, which reproduce asexually through a process
known as budding. When yeasts reproduce, the end result is a clone equal to
and separate from the original; however, in the case of eternal generation, as
understood by Origen, the primary cell would always remain primary and the
secondary cell always secondary. The process of “generation,” moreover, is
suspended in eternity in such a way that the secondary cell never separates
from its originator. Another useful metaphor that may help to explain the
concept of generation, and perhaps one closer to Origen’s own thought, might
be that of the will’s emergence from the mind.66 Explaining the relationship
between the Father and the Son in terms of eternal generation allowed
Origen to speak unabashedly of Christ as sharing coeternal existence with
the Father and thus participating in his nature.67 Thus, we can see in Origen a
Thus Origen wrote: “As no one can be a father without having a son, nor a
master without possessing a servant, so even God cannot be called omnipotent unless
there exist those over whom He may exercise His power” (Princ. 1.2.10; ANF 4:249250).
64
Ferguson, 368.
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Origen, Princ. 1.2.6 (ANF 4:248).
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Ibid., (ANF 4:247-248); cf. Rusch, 13.
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James Orr, The Progress of Dogma (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), 84. It is often
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strong tendency to underline the full divinity of Christ; however, despite such
forceful emphasis on Christ’s “full” divinity, all of Origen’s trinitarian theology
was nevertheless marked by an unrelenting bent toward subordinationism.68
This is understandable, considering the fact that he was a strong opponent
of a heresy known as Modalistic Monarchianism, which, in the name of the
unity of God, identified Christ with the Father.69 To counter this, Origen was
forced to find terminology that would point to the distinctions among the
three beings within the Godhead. To accomplish this, he introduced another
complicated Neoplatonic term, hypostasis, which carried strong connotations
of distinct personalities.70 While the Father was considered by Origen to be
the absolute God, and thus a special or unique category of hypostasis, the
Logos could not possibly fulfill such a function and, in the end, had to be
subordinated to the Father. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Origen
referring to Christ as the theos deuteros (second God).71
Origen’s subordinationism was most clearly asserted in his Commentary on
John, in which he argued against those who tended to exalt the Son excessively.
“This is why we say the Savior and the Holy Spirit transcend all created beings,
not by comparison, but by their exceeding pre-eminence. The Father exceeds
the Savior as much (or even more) as the Savior himself . . . exceed[s] the
rest.”72 In another place in the same volume, he stated that the Son “would not
remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth
of the Father.”73 Thus, it can be stated, in agreement with William Rusch, that
in Origen we find the Son whose “deity is derived from the fountainhead, the
Father. . . . In spite of the fact that the Word is one with the Father, he stands
on a lower level in the hierarchy.”74
the first Christian theologian who appeared to do so. See, e.g., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea
and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 24; McKim, 12; and John Behr, The Way to Nicea (Crestwood:
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 188. In recent years, however, M. J. Edwards
challenged this theory in his article, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homousios to the
Son?” (JTS 49 [Autumn 1998]: 658-670).
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See, e.g., Origen, Cels. 5.39 (ANF 4:561), in which Origen speaks of Christ as
a “second” God.
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Heresy in the Early Church (London: Ashgate, 2009), 65; and Ayres, 25.
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Books 13–32, ed. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
Press, 1993), 100.
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But what of the Holy Spirit? Here Origen went beyond Neoplatonism
and Clement. While discussing the nature of the Father, the Son, and their
intricate relationship, he utilized the subtleties of Greek philosophical
language; however, in his discourse on the Holy Spirit, he tended to rely
primarily on the testimony of the Scriptures.75 As with the Father and the
Son, he described the Holy Spirit in hypostatic language, i.e., as a being that
had a separate, divine personality. The scriptural evidence was so obvious to
him that he wondered how anyone could ever question the existence of the
third person of the Trinity. The “authority and dignity” of the Holy Spirit
was of such magnitude “that saving baptism was not complete except by
the authority of the most excellent Trinity of them all, i.e., by the naming of
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”76 The Spirit, he further argued in his Commentarii
in Romanos, “is always with the Father and the Son; and he always is, was, and
shall be, just like the Father and the Son.”77 Origen thus strongly affirmed the
coeternity of the Spirit.
How then is the Holy Spirit related to the Father and the Son? Consistent
with his subordinationist tendencies, Origen ranked the Holy Spirit below the
Father and the Son. The Spirit was the highest of all beings that proceeded,
or was eternally generated, from the Father and from the Son. Accordingly,
he wrote, “The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his
hypostasis, not only for it to exist, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and
just, and whatever other thing we ought to understand it to be by participation
in the aspects of Christ.”78 The role of the Spirit appears to be limited,
however, to supplying believers with God’s gifts, thus enabling the church to
function as the body of Christ.79
In Origen, then, we find two seemingly conflicting trends of trinitarian
thinking. On one hand, he came closer than any other contemporary church
father to the orthodox trinitarian expression of the Christian faith. None
of the early Christian thinkers exalted Christ and the Holy Spirit more than
he did. On the other, his philosophical presuppositions apparently rendered
him unable, or perhaps unwilling, to shake off the strong undercurrent of
subordinationism that typified his theological thinking.
Origen, Princ. 1.3 (ANF 4:251-254).
Ibid., 1.3.2 (ANF 4:252).
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Origen, Comm. Rom. 6.7.19, in Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,
Books 6–10, ed. Thomas P. Scheck (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
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Origen’s subordinationism clearly went hand in hand with his soteriology.
Like the rest of his theology, his soteriology was deeply marked by Greek
philosophy. As seen above, Origen posited the coeternal existence of the
universe inhabited by spiritual beings, or souls, toward whom God exercised
his perfect power and goodness and who were endowed with free will. At one
point in the past, some of these beings turned away from God. The physical
world was created in order to accommodate and reform these fallen beings,
who now, joined with earthly bodies, had to be saved, or restored, by God.80
The salvation of these lost souls was the primary reason for the incarnation
of the Logos, who united himself with a soul that had not sinned in a previous
existence.81 Through becoming a man, the Logos became a mediator between
the philosophical God—“simple, immutable, impassible, and unable to be
disturbed by time or emotion”82—and humanity.83
While on earth, Christ was both God and man84 and the main purpose
of his incarnation was to show humanity the pathway to eternal life,85 i.e.,
reaching the state of perfection, which clearly is an attribute of God. Human
beings, Origen believed, are completely free and are by nature “capable alike
of virtue and of wickedness.”86 Following the example of the incarnated
Christ, therefore, they could, if they chose to, embark on the journey toward
becoming divine.87 What began with Christ, i.e., “the union of the divine with
the human nature,” Origen argued, may also become a reality for humans, who
“by communion with the divine, might rise to be divine.”88 All they needed to
do was to “enter upon the life which Jesus taught.”89 The end result of this
process was being “changed into God,” 90 otherwise referred to in theological
Origen, Princ. 1.8.1, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,
1973), 67-68.
81
Ibid., 2.6.5 (Butterworth, 112); cf. Donald Fairbrain, “Patristic Soteriology:
Three Trajectories,” JETS 50 (June 2007): 298.
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Olson, The Story of Christian Theology, 111.
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literature as “deification,” or theosis.91 The following passage from Origen’s On
the First Principles clearly delineates this point:
Through participation in Christ in his character and wisdom and knowledge
and sanctification [each believer] advances and comes to higher degrees of
perfection; and when a man, by being sanctified through participation in the
Holy Spirit, is made purer and holier, he becomes more worthy to receive
the grace of wisdom and knowledge, in order that all stains of pollution
and ignorance may be purged and removed and that he may make so great
an advance in holiness and purity that the life which he received from God
shall be such as is worthy of God.92

Thus, in Origen’s system, salvation was the responsibility of individual
believers who, being completely free and having the inborn ability to choose
between good and evil, were exhorted by Christ and the Holy Spirit to go
through the stages of improvement until they were made perfect. Such
soteriology, notes Donald Fairbrain, “bears an unmistakable resemblance
to the Middle Platonic philosophy that had seeped into second-century
Alexandrian Christianity through Philo and Clement.”93
What of the NT teaching that salvation is to be obtained through the
blood of Christ on the cross? Williston Walker wrote that Origen “more than
any theologian since Paul, emphasized the sacrificial character of Christ’s
death.” Origen, however, did not consider this death as substitutionary, i.e.,
that Christ died on the cross in place of sinners. While Christ indeed suffered
and died on the cross, the primary value of his death lay in the fact that he
provided an example of “death endured for the sake of piety” and “for the
good of the human race.”94 Secondarily, his death served as “the first blow
See The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (1997), sv “Deification.” While
Origen does not appear to use the word theosis, his writings are permeated with the
concept. Cf. Origen, Comm. Jo. 2.19, 32.338 (trans. Ronald E. Heine, [Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1993], 99-100, 406); idem, Princ. 1.3.4,
1.3.8, 2.3.1-2, 4.4.9-10 (Butterworth, 31-32; 38; 83-85; 325-328); idem, Cels. 6.13 (ANF
4:579).
92
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the initiator into the supreme Gnosis” (Origen and His Work [Whitefish, MT: Kessinger,
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in the conflict which is to overthrow the power of that evil spirit the devil,”
who stood in the way of humanity toward perfect sanctification.95 Origen’s
hellenizing as well as his emphasis upon human achievement in the process
of salvation left little room for the sacrificial/substitutionary understanding
of Christ’s death so noticeable in the Pauline writings. Such ideas, he would
suggest, belong to the sphere of “simple man,” who has not yet reached a
state of enlightenment.96
While rejecting his soteriology and other elements of his teachings, many
Christian theologians who came after Origen acknowledged his theological
genius and attempted to refine his trinitarian thinking. Some moved toward
full trinitarianism and affirmed the unity and equality of Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit. Others, like Arius, brought Origen’s subordinationist views to
their ultimate conclusions and rendered Christ as a creature. These conflicting
points of view clashed during the first ecumenical council of the church of
Nicaea in 325 a.d.
The Importance of the Findings and Conclusion
The impact of the Alexandrian school of theology on ancient Christianity
was of such magnitude that no theologian who came after Origen could
ignore its speculations. To this day, church historians and theologians alike
consider the theological synthesis of Origen as one of the greatest theological
achievements of ante-Nicaean antiquity. Yet the Alexandrian school left
behind a dubious legacy. On one hand, its principal thinkers came closer than
any other contemporary thinkers to defining the nature of Christ and the
Holy Spirit as fully divine and coeternal with that of the Father himself. On
the other, their insatiable thirst for the philosophical wisdom of the age and
their desire to harmonize it with a NT faith resulted in a creeping syncretism
that threatened the core of the Christian faith. As a result of their lasting
influence, even the pillars of Christian orthodoxy, namely, the trinitarian
creeds of the Patristic era, are not free from philosophical contaminants.
Encouraged by their example, Catholic thinkers began to refer to philosophy
as ancilla theologiae, the “handmaid of theology,” thus facilitating a departure
from true biblical Christianity.97
It appears, however, that Christian theology’s infatuation with philosophy
had another, even more sinister, outcome, for it affected Christian soteriology
for generations to come. In this context, crucial questions relating to the
relationship between subordinationism and deification, or theosis, must
be asked. Was it coincidental that most pre-Nicaean church fathers were
subordinationists who believed in theosis as the mode of salvation? Or was
Origen, Cels. 7.16 (ANF 4:617).
Origen, Princ. 4.2.4-5 (Butterworth, 275-276).
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it an integral part of their Christology, in which the emphasis was on the
achievements of the man-Christ, who, while on earth, attained a divinized
status by his own efforts? Would that be the primary reason why, in Clement’s
and Origen’s writings, Christ’s sacrifice on the cross is deemphasized in favor
of following the example of Christ toward perfect sanctification?
By arguing for the full divinity of Christ, the Catholicism of the fourth
century rejected the soteriological implications of Alexandrian Christology.
Instead, under the influence of Cyprian and likeminded theologians, the
church became a salvation-bearing organization, in which the emphasis was
on the teaching that there was little or no possibility of salvation outside of
the church.98 The desire for theosis, or perfect sanctification, however, was
never entirely extinguished, and manifested itself in the monastic movement
and various self-mortification activities of medieval Catholicism.
Only with the advent of the Reformation was the idea of salvation
via theosis, or salvation via sanctification,99 dealt a serious blow, as the focus
moved from human achievements to Christ’s achievements on the cross. Both
Luther and Calvin denied the possibility of human-divine cooperation with
regard to salvation.100 Human beings, they charged, were too damaged by sin
to even respond to God’s initiative. God, they claimed, being the sovereign
ruler of the universe, was completely in charge of human salvation. This is
understandable. When salvation is placed entirely within the predestinarian
framework, and thus based entirely on God’s eternal decrees, any human
action/response is redundant.101 A sanctified life might be the desired result
of election, but its presence or lack thereof does not serve as an indication as
to whether a person is actually saved. Calvin and Luther, therefore, stand on
the opposite extreme of soteriological thinking to that of the early Christian
theologians, such as Clement or Origen.
Luther and Calvin’s position was challenged during the seventeenth century
by the German Pietists and the Remonstrants (Arminians), respectively.102
Olson, The Story of Christian Theology, 117; Lohse, 97.
This is not to say that both Luther and Calvin denied the possibility of theosis.
Sanctification was still possible for these reformers, but not as a mode of salvation. For
more information, see Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung, eds., Partakers
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The thinkers of both movements argued that the human response to God’s
initiative did matter and that a saved person’s life would always show signs
of sanctification. Human decisions thus played an important role in the
process of salvation. Methodism, and later Adventism, was born out of these
two movements. These theologies tended to set sanctification in a proper
relationship to salvation (or justification): that of the necessary fruit of
salvation.
Within modern Adventism, we are currently witnessing a resurgence of
a version of Alexandrian thinking with reference to both Christ’s divinity
and the resultant soteriology. On one hand, few contemporary Adventist
antitrinitarians agree with Uriah Smith and other early Adventist pioneers,
who claimed that Christ was created. On the other hand, however, neither are
they willing to accept the trinitarian teaching of Christ’s coeternal, fully equal
divinity. Thus, their only option is Clement and Origen’s concept of generation
(or begetting), which, they believe, happened so far in the past before there
was time, that for all practical purposes Christ could be considered coeternal.
They, like Clement and Origen, may thus be classified as subordinationists,
or, as some refer to themselves, “Fountarians.” Does their subordinationism/
fountarianism have any effect on their soteriology? I believe it does. A careful
study of antitrinitarian Adventist literature (mostly self-published) reveals an
interesting trend: the centerpiece of their soteriology appears to be the life of
Christ on earth and the example he provided for believers.103 While the death
See, e.g., an unpublished paper by Australian author Adrian Ebens, “Return of
Elijah, submitted for evaluation to the South Pacific Biblical Research Committee in
2007. In his document of about 200 pages, Ebens spends considerable effort arguing
that Jesus is not coequal with the Father in terms of authority and power and that
the Father alone is the fount of all life, including that of Christ. At the same time,
Ebens links his argumentation against the trinitarian position with his view that,
during his incarnation, Christ adopted the postfallen nature of humanity, positions
taught by E. J. Waggoner and A. T. Jones, and which he believes was the “essence
of the 1888 message.” He thus correctly and incisively argues that “the Doctrine
of the Trinity is logically inconsistent with Christ taking our fallen nature” and with
“traditional” Adventist teachings such as, e.g., character perfection. It is interesting
to note that, while keeping the commandments and character perfection receive a
fair amount of attention, an emphasis on Christ’s accomplishment on the cross on
behalf of humanity is entirely missing in this work. As a result, a reader receives a clear
impression that, for Ebens, salvation is a result of a person’s submissive relationship
with God and Christ (the Holy Spirit is considered as a “power” rather than a being)
and following the example of Christ. He thus writes: “Our submission to His request
to keep the Sabbath, connects us to God in an obedient relationship. In the same
manner our submission to the Son of God . . . connects us directly to God in an
obedient relationship. It is the submission in obedience that opens to us the flow of
the Father’s blessing” (Unpublished paper, 101-105). While obedience and submission
do play a role in the process of salvation, they are always a response to what Christ
103
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of Christ on the cross and its implications are occasionally mentioned, the
writers (like Origen and Clement) focus mainly on Christ’s accomplishments
on earth and his subordination to God the Father.104 While the example of
Jesus must not be ignored in the daily life of a believer, the above analysis
shows that a soteriology that focuses almost exclusively on the life of Jesus
has its roots directly in the pre-Nicaean teachings of the early church fathers
and especially those connected to the Alexandrian school of theology. In fact,
I believe that the ultimate roots of a soteriology of perfectionism lie in Greek
philosophy.
Adventist soteriology values sanctification and the example Christ left for
his followers. But sanctification has its proper place in relation to justification.
The latter comes first and was accomplished for believers through Christ’s
substitutionary sacrifice on the cross. Only then, and through a voluntary
acceptance of Christ’s accomplishments on the cross, God, through his Holy
Spirit, works in the life of the believer “to will and to act according to his
good purpose” (Phil 2:13; Heb 13:20-21). A reversal of this sequence, that is,
an exaltation of sanctification to being the mode of salvation, leads directly to
a return to the high philosophical ideals of the ancient Greeks.

accomplished on the cross. With this emphasis missing, Eben’s teachings are simply a
return to Clement’s and Origen’s points of view. For similar positions, see also the selfpublished antitrinitarian work by Allen Stump, The Foundation of Our Faith: Over 150
Years of Seventh-day Adventist Christology (Welch WV: Smyrna Gospel Ministries, n.d.).
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